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Introduction 
Like Luhmann created a humanless theory society, these papers will attempt to create a 
basic framework for cybernetic analysis of social systems that prescinds of him, that is, 
there will not be an application of terminology of second cybernetics-autopoiesis- to 
social systems. The purpose of this first paper in the series is to initiate the efforts 
towards an idea of a third order in cybernetics.  
Second order cybernetics will be used as a biological basis for social processes. It will 
be stated that where first cybernetics deals with observed systems and second with 
observing systems, the third order studies mutually observing systems, which endows 
them features of the first two types. 
Also, while first cybernetics deals with allopoietic machines, and second with 
autopoietic or living machines, the object of analysis of third cybernetics is language as 
a cognitive machine that creates a common domain of interaction between living 
systems in order to interact. These types of machines are abstract mechanisms that have 
a basis in the human brain and that store, retrieve, process and create information, and 
as such is both allopoietic and autopoietic; therefore, cognitive machines are 
omnipoietic.  
This paper will also account for the creation of social reality by means of a collective 
assignation of functions by means of speech acts and will use the philosophical 
scholarship of John Searle to achieve this purpose. 1 Also, society will be analyzed 
under the lens of complex systems theory. Searle’s idea of social ontology explains 
Society on a micro level; the meso level is studied by social systems and complex 
systems theory enables the study of society from a macro perspective.  
 
1. Cybernetics  
Cybernetics is an interdisciplinary approach to organization, irrespective of a system's 
material realization.2 The contents of this discipline can be divided by its history and 
content in two: first order cybernetics, which encompasses machines and second order 
cybernetics, which centers on living systems. 3  Although the usage of biological 
cybernetics on social systems is widespread, the idea of a third order in cybernetics as 
the domain of social systems has been talked about by some scholars. 
                                                
1 Searle, J.R. (1998). Mind, Language and Society. Basic Books, 8.  
2 Cybernetics. In Web Dictionary of Cybernetics and Systems. Retrieved from 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/CYBERNETICS.html 
3  Geyer, F., van der Zouwen, J. (Eds.) (2001), Introduction.  In Sociocybernetics: Complexity, 
Autopoiesis and Observations of Social Systems. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1. 
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a) First and second order cybernetics: Observed and observing systems 
Maturana and Varela (2012) distinguish allopoietic machines from autopoietic machines 
(living systems). The former is defined as “machines that have as a product of their 
function something different from themselves”4 The machines that cannot product their 
own components are used for a purpose, they are controlled systems, while those that 
can are observing system and can control other systems. The authors coincide with this 
direction when they say: “Man made machines are all made with some purpose… This 
aim usually appears expressed in the product of the operation of the machine, but not 
necessarily so”. 
 Because the purpose of the machines is set by their creators and users, it can be said 
that first order cybernetics is teleological. It can be concluded then that first order 
cybernetics is the study of organization (observation and teleology) in allopoietic 
machines.  
Maturana and Varela (2012) define autonomy as the: “Self asserting capacity of living 
systems to maintain their identity through the active compensation of deformation”. 
This idea leads to the concept of autopoiesis. An autopoietic system is a machine that 
produces its own components and occupies a space in which it carries out its processes. 
It is important to note then that these types of machine are not teleological, that is, their 
purposes are not set by an observer. Living systems are teleonomical, that is, they have 
an apparent purpose or project of organization, which can be attributed to a causal 
feedback relation attributable to natural selection.5  
Second order cybernetics is the study of the organization in autopoietic machines, which 
are able to build their own components, and possess cognizance which allows them to 
observe and control other machines. 
Although both deal with machines, there are a set of differences between first and 
second order cybernetics. This can be summarized in the following schema: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Maturana, H.R., Varela, F.J. (2012) Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Dodrecht: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 135. 
5 Lesne, A., Bourgine, P. (Eds.) (2006) Introduction. In Morphogenesis. Origins of Patterns and Shapes. 
Dodrecht: Springer, 11. 
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First order Second order 
Heteropoietic Autopoietic 
Inert systems Living systems 
Teleological Teleonomical 
Observed systems Observing systems 
 
First order machines are heteropoietic because they produce something different from 
themselves, by means of human design. This is a feature of inert systems, which are not 
able to build their own components, and which purposes are determined by an observer 
(teleology), therefore they are observed systems.   
Second order machines produce only themselves, therefore they are living and their 
purpose is determined by the feedback with their environment (teleonomy). Some of 
them can be cognizant and capable of self description, which means that they observe 
and can use first order machines.   
 
b). Third order 
i). The transition from second to third order cybernetics: social autopoiesis 
The application of second order cybernetics to social systems to explain their 
functioning has become commonplace in the students of cybernetics, sociology and 
complexity. In particular, the concept of autipoiesis, envisioned by Maturana and Varela 
has been stated as a feature of social systems. 
To Fuchs the term autopoiesis is inappropriate for describing the self-organization of 
society, because it is a biological term that should not be directly mapped into social 
systems. Biological processes are the foundation of social systems, but not the core of 
sociability. He also says that one of the main problems of using these terms on social 
systems is that one cannot consider the individuals as their components. This results in 
subject-less theories of society that can’t explain how individuals reproduce social 
structures and how the sociality is reproduced by them.6  
 
                                                
6 Fuchs, C. Concepts of Social Self-Organization. Retrieved from   
http://www.self-organization.org/results/papers/pdf/hsicpaper4.pdf 
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Maturana and Varela (2012) say that despite the fact that both organisms and societies 
are types of metasystems, the difference between them is the degree of autonomy in 
their components. While the units of an organism have little or no independence, those 
of social systems have a maximum degree of autonomy:  
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, applying a second order cybernetics framework to social systems implies a 
distortion in the former and does not capture the full complexity of the latter.7  
 
 
ii). Points of convergence between second and third order cybernetics 
The subject of cognition is the bridges that unites autopoietic systems and social 
systems, because the former are systems capable of it, while the latter are the product of 
socialization, which is consequence of cognition. Maturana (2012) defines it in the 
following way:  
A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of interactions in 
which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself, and the process of cognition 
is the actual (inductive) acting or behaving in the domain. Living systems are cognitive 
systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is valid for all 
organisms, with and without a nervous system. 
                                                
7 Umpleby, S.A. What comes after second order cybernetics? Retrieved from 
http://www.gwu.edu/~umpleby/recent_papers/2001_what_comes_after_second_order_cybernetics.htm 
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In its most basic sense cognition is the processing of information made by an 
autopoietic system in its interaction with what surrounds it (environment and other 
beings) with the purpose of sustaining itself. This will be called lower cognition. 
Maturana (2012) distinguishes a set of degrees when it comes to the interactions that a 
system can have, he states three, each of which is contained in the preceding one:  
• Cognitive domain: Comprises all the interactions of the organism and can be 
enlarged by adding new modes of interaction.  
• Domain of interactions: Set of interactions into which an entity can enter.  
• Domain of relations: Set interactions through the observer in which an entity can 
be observed. 
Another interesting point brought forth by this author is his famous phrase: “Anything 
said is said by an observer”, that is, to understand cognition the observer must 
comprehend his role in it. When one observes and interacts with the environment, one 
creates notions like that of entity (organisms for purposes of this study), when one 
distinguishes it from its surroundings and other similar things.   
By observing and interacting, an entity can make representations of his surroundings 
and thus understand it and interact further with it, creating further constructs that 
constitute the cognitive domain in a recursive cycle that ends when the being loses is 
autopoiesis and dies. 
One becomes an observer by “recursively generating representations of our interactions, 
and by interacting with several representations simultaneously we generate relations 
with the representations of which we can then interact and repeat this process 
recursively”. An observer can define himself as an entity by identifying his own domain 
of interactions and yet remain as an observer if he treats them as independent entities. 
An entity can achieve self-observation by means of repeated self-description and self-
consciousness by means of self-observation (Maturana and Varela, 2012).  
Self consciousness is the point of transition between lower cognition (which pertains 
second cybernetics) and that which belongs to human beings(which is the object of 
study of what will be called fourth order cybernetics), which will be called higher 
cognition. This is because when a system becomes fully self-conscious and observes 
itself, it can set its own purpose, which is tempered by the interaction with the 
environment. A self-observing system- unlike other cognitive systems- is both 
teleonomical and teleological. 
Self-consciousness is a consensual phenomenon (not a biologic one) which comes from 
an independent domain of interactions from self-orienting behavior and lies entirely in 
the linguistic domain and requires a minimum of two interacting organisms with similar 
domains of interactions. It is both an interaction and a communication because these 
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interrelated behaviors bring forth a cooperative system of consensual interactions in 
which the emerging conduct of the two organisms is relevant for both.  
Language creates a cooperative domain of interactions between speakers through the 
development of a common frame of reference, although each speaker acts exclusively 
within his cognitive domain (Maturana and Varela, 2012). 
Finally, to conclude the topic of cognition and to unite it with social systems it is useful 
to provide a notion of higher cognition and one of man. The first can be defined as: The 
processing (storage, retrieval, transformation, creation and transmission)8 of information 
made by an autopoietic system in its interaction with what surrounds it (environment 
and other beings) with the possibility of stating a purpose beyond self-sustainment.   
Man is a deterministic and relativistic self-referring autopoietic system whose life 
acquires its peculiar dimension through self-consciousness. He constructs his rational 
systems based on arbitrarily accepted truths (premises), which he changes continually 
(Maturana and Varela, 2012). 
 
 
iii). Mutually observing systems 
Von Foerster takes Maturana’s idea of “Anything said is said by an observer” and 
complements it by saying: “Anything said is said to an observer”, and connects them in 
the following way:9 
• An observer is characterized by being able to make descriptions.  
• Observers connect through language. 
• Society is formed by a common usage of language. 
• The interrelation of these concepts is circular: it cannot be determined which one 
was first. 
	  
Taking this into consideration it can be said that third order cybernetics studies mutually 
observing systems. This point was reached before by Jon-Arild Johannssen and Arnulf 
Hauan (1994), who define third order cybernetics as “the relationship between 
observers”. They deal with communication systems by centering on their 
communicative process, which is what holds them together. 10 To them communication 
                                                
8Stillings, N.A., Weisler, S.E., Chase, C.,  Feinstein, M.H.,  Garfield, J.L. Rissland, E.L. (1995), 
Cognitive Science: An introduction. (2nd ed.) Cambridge: MIT Press, 1.  
9 von Foerster, H., Cybernetics of Cybernetics. Retrieved from http://jlombardi.net/pdf/cyber_cyber.pdf 
10 Johannssen, J., Hauan, A. (1994) Communication- A Systems Theoretical Point of View (Third Order 
Cybernetics), Systems Practice, 7(1), 68. 
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is “to take part in and share, that is, together to look after what is. From this 
understanding of communication, one might say that the knowledge is in the 
relationships between people who communicate, and not a property of the individuals 
involved”.  
Social systems have features of both first and second order cybernetics, which explains 
why it has been studied from both perspectives, although without a complete 
understanding of its nature. A third order cybernetic system has the following features: 
• They are heteropoietic because they are created by means of the cognitive 
processes of a living system.  
• They are both teleological and teleonomical systems because they can be used 
by an observing system for a purpose, but their purpose can also be determined 
as an adaptive reaction to an environment.  
• The relationship between teleology and teleonomy is circular: the goals of the 
individual can be influenced by the environment, but also the former can 
influence the latter to achieve his goals.  
• Because they are the product of the communication between them and their 
respective cognitive processes; social systems tend to imitate living systems.  
	  
Johannssen and Hauan(1994) state their framework for communication: 
• People	  interact	  
• The	  interactions	  are	  messages,	  which	  contain	  three	  parts:	  
• An	  information	  part,	  where	  there	  is	  both	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  information	  
• A	   leading/	   directing	   (or	   command)	   part,	   which	   means	   the	   intentional	   and	  
influentional	  part.	  
• A	  relationship	  part.	  The	  message	  in	  a	  communicative	  process	  is	  always	  carried	  
out	   in	   a	   loop.	   Messages	   run	   in	   circles,	   and	   return	   to	   their	   own	   source	   and	  
control	  it;	  they	  are	  circular	  or	  recursive.	  
• The	  interactions	  operate	  in	  circular	  causal	  loops	  
• The	  smallest	  entity	  in	  communication	  is	  the	  triad	  action-­‐reaction-­‐resultant.	  The	  
latter	  constitutes	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  code.	  
• The	   information	   impact	   upon	   one	   element	   in	   the	   communication	   process	   is	  
looked	   upon	   as	   interpretation	   and	   transformation	   of	   the	   information	   part	   in	  
the	  message.	  	  
	  
Although this framework was conceived for organizations, it results useful to 
incorporate it into social systems in general. Although they foresee the communicative 
aspect of third order cybernetics, which is the relationship between observing systems, 
they fail to state the nature of language (and its importance) in this relationship. 
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In the same fashion that first and second order systems are machines of varying nature, 
so are third order systems, which are cognitive machines that help to create a common 
frame of reference between existing domains of interactions pertaining to different 
autopoietic systems. This can be inferred by the definition of language as “an abstract 
cognitive system that uniquely allows humans to produce and comprehend meaningful 
utterances”.11 Language is a third order cybernetic machine and it stands between 
Johannssen and Hauan’s “people interact” and “the interactions are messages”.  
Although it will be seen in full detail in the paper relative to fourth order cybernetics, a 
tentative definition of cognitive machines can be this: Information processing 
mechanisms of the high order that has their basis within the neural network of human 
beings, that is, it is the cybernetics of human beings. High cognition as information 
processing can consist of storage, retrieval, transformation and creation of information, 
among other functions. Cognitive machines, to be considered as such, must do three 
functions: 
• Storage and retrieval of information.   
• Help to understand received information. 
• Create new information. 
 
 Information is both their input and output, and it can be used either to create new data, 
different from that received or to broaden the existing information storage in the brain, 
which can result in the expansion of the cognitive domain. This wrecks havoc in the 
existing classification between allopoietic and autopoietic machines, because cognitive 
machines both create things other than themselves, but also can create or recreate 
themselves by means of their inputs. Cognitive machines are omnipoietic because they 
can produce both their own components and information other than itself. Omnipoiesis, 
that is, the ability to create all kinds of output (internal and external to self) is the 
distinguishing features of cognitive machines, which are the subject of study of third 
and fourth order cybernetic systems. 
Also of importance are speech acts, which Ohio State (2011) defines as “actions that are 
performed only through using language: a term that describes the use of speech 
emphasizing the speaker’s intention or goal in producing an utterance”. An important 
distinction to be made is that language resides within the nervous system of autopoietic 
systems and it manifests itself outside of it by means of speech acts. 
Maturana and Varela (2012) define the relations that define a machine as a unity and 
define the dynamics of interaction and subsequent transformations are called 
                                                
11  Ohio State University (2011) Language Files: Materials for an introduction to language and 
linguistics.(11th ed.) Columbus: Ohio State University, 695.  
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organization, while a structure is the relations between components that integrate a 
concrete machine in a given space. 
In the case of third order cybernetic machines, organization is comprised by language 
and structure by speech acts, and the material space where they manifest is in the 
biological cognitive processes of self-conscious autopoietic systems. 
Language and speech acts are necessary for the creation of institutional facts, which are 
an assignation of function to objects and people by means of a collective intentionality 
expressed by means of a speech act. Institutional facts are cognitive machines that are 
structured in the cognitive processes of humans, who relate them to the object or person 
to whom they are assigning a value. 
Money is the perfect example of such thing. The organization of the institutional fact is 
within the individuals knowledge of language, in words like “money”, “dinero” and 
“argent”. While the structure is materialized in the speech act by which “X counts as 
money in the context of social relations” 12  in the mind of the subjects of 
communication.  
It was then said that language is a cognitive machine that bridges the gap between 
cognitive systems through speech acts and has a physical manifestation in the human 
brain. It also has the following features, as defined by Ohio State (2011): 
• Modality: Means trough which messages can be conveyed and received, 
examples of this are writing, speaking and gestures. 
• Semanticity: All signals in a communication system have a meaning or function.  
• Pragmatic function: Languages must serve a useful purpose. 
• Interchangeability: It is the ability of individuals to send and receive 
information.  
• Cultural transmission: Certain aspects of a language can only be acquired trough 
interaction with other users of the system. 
• Arbitrariness: The meaning of a language cannot be predicted by the form, nor 
the form is determined by the meaning. 
• Displacement: It is the ability of a language to communicate about things and 
actions that are not preset in space or time while speakers are communicating.  
• Productivity: It is the capacity of a language to convey novel messages by means 
of recombining existing units. 
                                                
12  The formula is used by philosopher John Searle and is stated as “X counts as Y in C”. 
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A speech act is observable behavior that can have a variety of aims, it is the 
materialization of language and as such is not restricted to the spoken word, it can also 
be a sign, a gesture or a set of words.13 Speech acts can be analyzed on three levels:14  
• Locutionary, or direct speech act: It is an utterance that performs its function in a 
direct and literal manner.  
• Perlocutionary, or indirect speech act: Utterance that performs its function in an 
indirect and nonliteral manner.  
• Ilocutionary or perfomative speech act: A speech act that employs a 
performative verb, that is, a verb that denotes a linguistic action.  
Speech acts have a direction of fit, which is the relation that exists between the 
propositional content of the utterance and an existing reality. There are four different 
types:15 
• Word to world: The propositional content of the utterance fits an existing reality. 
• World to word: The reality must change according to the content of the 
utterance. 
• No propositional content, or “null”: There is no difference between the utterance 
and the existing state of affairs. 
• Double direction of fit: When the illocutionary act is satisfied, the world is 
transformed by the present action of the speaker to fit the propositional content 
by the fact that the speaker represents it as being so transformed. 
	  
Searle enumerates five types of illocutionary speech acts:16  
• Assertives: They represent how things are (word to world direction of fit). 
• Directives: They try to conduct human behavior to a purpose(world to word). 
• Comissives: They are promises that commit the speaker to an action (world to 
word). 
• Expressives: Exteriorizes the feelings and attitudes of the speaker (no direction 
of fit). 
                                                
13Speech Acts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/speech-­‐acts/ 
14Speech Acts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/speech-­‐acts/Ohio State University (2011) Language Files: Materials 
for an introduction to language and linguistics.(11th ed.) Columbus: Ohio State University, 695.  
15 Speech Acts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/speech-­‐acts/	  Vanderveken, D. Meaning and Speech Acts, (Vol. I). 
Retrieved from http://www.uqtr.ca/~vandervk/elementary_illocutionary_acts.pdf 
16Searle, J.R. (2010) Making the Social World.  New York: Oxford University Press, 69. 
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• Declaration: There is a declaration which is to be materialized (double direction 
of fit). 
	  
Finally, the illocutionary force of a speech act is defined by Vanderveken in terms of 
seven features: 
• Illocutionary point: This is the characteristic aim of each type of speech act. 
• Degree of strength of the illocutionary point: Two illocutions can have the same 
point but differ along the dimension of strength.  
• Mode of achievement: This is the special way, if any, in which the illocutionary 
point of a speech act must be achieved.  
• Propositional content conditions: Some illocutions can only be achieved with an 
appropriate propositional content. 
• Preparatory conditions: These are all other conditions that must be met for the 
speech act not to misfire.  
• Sincerity conditions: Many speech acts involve the expression of a 
psychological state.  
• Degree of strength of the sincerity conditions: Two speech acts might be the 
same along other dimensions, but express psychological states that differ from 
one another in the dimension of strength. 
 
2. Society: An outline of a cybernetic model 
a) Micro perspective: The creation of social reality 
i). Intentionality 
Now that the basic tenets of social cybernetics have been seen, it is important to see 
other concepts necessary to create a basic cybernetic perspective of Society. Searle 
(1983) gives an initial account of intentionality: “…is that property of many mental 
states and events by which they are directed or about or of objects and states of affairs 
in the world”.17  He also states that “some, not all, mental states and events have 
Intentionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of 
nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional”. 
Searle (1983) creates a theory of intentionality based on language, specifically, on 
speech acts. In this model, the intentional states have a representative content in a 
psychological mode (beliefs, hopes, fears or others) and while many of those contents 
                                                
17Searle, J.R., (1983) Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge, 1.  
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might have an entire proposition, this is not necessary. As with speech acts, intentional 
states have directions of fit and conditions of satisfaction.  
The concepts of Network and Background determine the content of the conditions of 
satisfactions of an Intentional state. The first is the group of other intentional acts that 
serve as a context for the intentional act. The second is the set of practices and 
preintentional assumptions that are not intentional states or their conditions of 
satisfaction and that enable all representing to take place. It includes biological and 
cultural capacities, skills, stances, assumptions and presuppositions.18 
In the context of third order cybernetics, the Network is the group of signs which can be 
interpreted to give meaning to the action which is being made, while the Background is 
not only a set of signs, but their understanding by an individual, its capacity to 
understand them, that is, his cognition, and his capacity to create them and that of others 
to understand them. There are points of convergence between both Network and 
Background, whereas the practices and assumptions that inform the Network might 
form part of the Background as well, however, the former is not a part of the latter.  
Searle (2010) defines action as "a causal and Intentional transaction between mind and 
the world". Three are the elements of this transaction: prior intention, intention in action 
and bodily movement. This can be represented in the following way:19  
 
action 
___________________________ 
prior intention -> intention-in-action -> movement 
 
The prior intention is the initiation of the transaction by means of a representation of the 
whole action before it is undertaken, and because of this, the action is its condition of 
satisfaction. The prior intention is self referential, for it takes itself as the cause of action 
and it can be satisfied only if it’s the cause of the action, that is, there has to be an 
element of volition. This has as a consequence that not all prior intentions are concreted 
into an action, some are never set in motion.  
Intention-in-action, unlike prior intention which comes as a feature of premeditated or 
deliberate action, is not formed in advance of the action, but it provokes the act by 
representing its condition of satisfaction in that moment. Like prior intention, it is self 
                                                
18 Background. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind. Retrieved from 
,http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/thebackground.html 
19 Prior Intention. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind. Retrieved from 
http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/priorintention.html 
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referential, because only be deemed successful if it is the cause of the movement.20 Both 
the prior intention and the intention in action are the mental states that prologue the 
bodily movement and together they encompass an action.   
Searle (1983) states that collective intentionality has the same elements of individual 
intentionality and the conditions of satisfaction of both are causally self referential. 
However, collective intention cannot be reduced to a grouping of individual ones or “I 
intend”, but it is a “we-intend”. He also states that to be able to put in action a set of 
individual intentions (as intention resides in the brain) each of the participants of 
collective intentionality has to presuppose that everyone is doing their part.  
Although it might not always require speech acts, collective intentionality is used within 
an existing cognitive, cultural and linguistic frame, i.e. the Background, and it also has a 
set of assumptions and signs which provide the context for the actions, which is the 
Network. 
Searle also makes a distinction between collective recognition and cooperation by 
saying that the former does not entail the presence of the latter. Recognition entails 
acknowledging the existence and function of something, while cooperation is a set of 
actions that are focused towards the attainment of a goal. The existence of an institution 
requires collective recognition, but actions within it do need cooperation.  
 
ii). Assignation of function and status functions  
To Searle (1983), language is a form of intentionality that has a biological basis. It is the 
basis for the ontological apparatus by which human beings create institutional facts. The 
primary function of language is to enable communication between its users and the 
content of said communication are intentional states, which communicate information 
about the world. 
The assignment of functions is part of the apparatus necessary to account for the 
construction of social reality.21 Functions can be defined as “a cause that serves a 
purpose” (Searle 1983) and as he notes, they are observer relative and can be classified 
in: agentive, when the function assigned is related to human intentions, non-agentive, 
when this is not the case, and within the former, when the assigned function is that of 
intentionality. (Searle 1983).  
Status functions require collective intentionality for their creation and continued 
existence and are functions that a person or entity has in virtue of a collective 
                                                
20  Intention in Action. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind. Retrieved from 
http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/intentioninaction.html 
21 Searle, J.R. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press, 13. 
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recognition, they also require a language, as they need markers that indicate the 
existence of a function, although there are institutional facts, like money and wedding 
rings, that do not directly need language but they use semantics (Searle 1998). 
Although language is a cognitive machine, the objects that are bestowed a function by 
means of a speech act are not. They are signs to be interpreted by the users of a 
language by means of their cognitive processes. The assignation of function by means 
of a language creates signs that are to be interpreted certain way by those with the same 
or similar Background and Networks.  
 
iii). Institutional facts  
Searle (2010) distinguishes between two types of rules: Regulative, which norm certain 
behavior, and constitutive, which create the possibility of the behavior they regulate. 
They first have the formula “Do X”, while the second is “X counts as Y in context C”.  
Brute Facts are those that exist independently of human beings, while institutional facts 
depend of human institutions and are the result of an assignation of a function on a brute 
fact by means of collective intentional acts that use language as a vehicle. That is, when 
a brute fact is given a status function, they become an institutional fact, which means 
that they are  intentionality and language dependent, that is, without the use of 
intentionality and language they would not be able to exist (Searle,1995)  
The function of language is important in the assignment of function and the creation of 
institutional facts, as it is primarily a mean to convey information about the world 
(intentional states) among individuals. The double sense of fit of the declarative speech 
acts are the thing that makes possible for language to create institutional facts and also it 
does not have a prelinguistic equivalent. The formula of constitutive rules is applied 
to a brute fact or series of brute facts by means of a declarative speech acts (Searle, 
2010).  
As it was stated before, institutional facts are not cognitive machines, they are merely 
signs to be interpreted and recognized by members of a Society. To see an institutional 
fact is to interpret its meaning. They are the product of a continuous and circular 
communicative process, by means of which society organizes and reorganizes itself by 
means of speech acts, and their interpretation by means of cognition.  
 
iv). Deontic powers 
The declaration allows the creation of rights, obligations and duties by means of a 
commitment to the truth of what was stated, that is, the declarative speech act brings 
about deontic powers. In a “Status Function Declaration”, there is a statement of how 
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the world is and how it should be, and as this speech act is accepted by others, there is a 
change in the state of affairs of the world and social reality is created.  
That is, to say “this is our leader”, “that is his property” is to convey a meaning among a 
group of individuals and a function to a brute fact, to give an obligation to obey the 
commands of the leader and the right to demand him to behave within the scope of his 
legal attributions, to have an obligation of respecting the belongings of others and the 
right that one has of using, abusing and perceiving the fruits of an object.  In being able 
to carry this meaning to others and to get them to consensus and to behave in a certain 
way is what holds human society together. 
 
 
b). Meso perspective: Social Systems 
i). Social reality 
 lthough Searle does not explicitly give a definition or theory of Society, it happens that 
society is not only a collectivity of human beings, but it is also comprised by their 
knowledge and their institutional creation, that is, unlike Functionalist approaches 
which focus on structures or Action Theory that centers on individuals, this approach to 
Society accounts for both the individuals that comprise it and the institutional facts that 
they created and maintain through declarations and other speech acts. In summary, 
Society is more than the sum of its parts. 
The micro level of analysis accounts the process of social ontology by means of which 
institutional facts are created. The meso level of analysis will deal with social systems, 
that is, individuals grouped towards the attainment of a goal which set a boundary to 
separate themselves from their environment. This term is an equivalent to that of 
organization.  
Social systems as a meso approach overlaps with social ontology, because it is a form of 
social interaction by means of language and speech acts, but it is distinguished from it 
because for the purposes of having a discernible unit of analysis. The micro perspective 
was used to describe the actions to be analyzed.   
Johannes van der Zouwen and Cor van Dijkum (2001) define social system as “a system 
in which actors, their actions and/or their communications form the elements… a set of 
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interacting elements separated from its environment by a boundary”.22 Social systems 
can determine their boundaries in the following manner: 23 
• Focusing on the actors to determine who belongs or not to the organization. 
• Centering on the social distance between actors within the organization and 
others, that is, the social relations of a specific type that involve certain actors.  
• Focusing on the nature of the activities performed by the organization. 
 
ii). Defining features of social systems 
Social systems have the following features: 24 
• Openness of the system: They can receive input from their environment and 
send out put to the environment. Although during this transformation, delays 
may occur. 
• Self structuring: They are able to set and reset the boundaries that distinguish it 
from the environment.  
• Self maintaining: They are able to sustain themselves by means of taking 
resources from the outside. 
• Self reflective: Social systems are able to make observations about their state, 
input and output. Not only are they self- observing, but they are reflexive, that 
is, they can reflect on themselves and generate expectation about future 
situations. 
• Self creative: Because individuals that form a social system are self-conscious 
and have a capacity for creation, have the ability to create new systems and 
structures, and recreate existing ones. 
• Teleological and teleonomical: Social systems are able to set their own goals, 
but at the same time they respond to the environment. They are learning 
systems.  
• Homeostatic: Social systems are able to maintain themselves within a turbulent, 
unpredictable, and uncontrollable environment. 
                                                
22 van der Zouwen J., van Dijkum C. Chapter 13. In Geyer F., van der Zouwen, J. (Eds.) (2001) 
Sociocybernetics: Complexity, Autopoiesis and Observations of Social Systems. Westport, 
Connecticut:Greenwood Press 225, 226. 
23Scott, W.R., Davis, G.F. (2007) Organizations and Organizing. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 
Prentice Hall 152, 153.  
24 Scott, W.R., Davis, G.F. (2007) Organizations and Organizing. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 
Prentice Hall 152, 153.van der Zouwen J., van Dijkum C. Chapter 13. In Geyer F., van der Zouwen, J. 
(Eds.) (2001) Sociocybernetics: Complexity, Autopoiesis and Observations of Social Systems. Westport, 
Connecticut:Greenwood Press 225, 226. Fuchs, C., Concepts of Social Self-Organization. Retrieved from 
http://www.self-organization.org/results/papers/pdf/hsicpaper4.pdf 
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Language is a cognitive machine that is omnipoietic, that is, with its inputs it can create 
both things other than itself and also their own components. Self creation distinguishes 
social system from allopoietic and autopoietic systems. Social systems are able to create 
new structures and components or change existing forms to adapt to both an 
environment or a purpose. This differs from the idea of autopoiesis, which consists of 
systems being able to create their own components within a closed space.  
Social systems are operationally open, while autopoietic systems are closed. Social 
systems are both teleonomical and teleological, but autopoietic systems which are only 
teleological. This means that social systems can have constant feedback with its 
environment and also determine the boundaries that mediate between them, they can 
ponder between outside pressures and the set goals and with all that in consideration 
create and recreate themselves. Autopoietic systems produce their own components and 
can couple structurally with its environment, which irritates it and sets its “purpose” by 
means of an adaptation process. 
The reason why social systems are self creative, is because languages have generativity, 
that is, they have the capacity to have an infinite number of sentences. That is, language 
is a creative cognitive machine, which by means of providing a symbolic basis for 
rationality, also endows it with self creation. 
 
 
3. Macro perspective: Society as a complex adaptive system 
a). Society as a complex system  
The macro perspective of this study that of complex adaptive systems, comprises the 
totality of social systems and ontological and communicative processes. Social systems 
are complex systems for a variety of reasons:  
First, they have a degree of hierarchy, a feature of complex systems proposed by 
Simon25, as they are composed of subsystems, which in turn are composed of other 
subsystems and so on. They are also on the edge of order and chaos, that is, they are 
neither in complete order or in a chaotic state, as it can be seen that some subsystems 
can have sensitive dependence to initial conditions. 
Social systems are time dependent seeing that they calibrate their actions according to 
its passage, learning from past experiences and attempting to foresee other 
                                                
25Simon,H. The architecture of complexity, Retrieved from http://ecoplexity.org/files/uploads/Simon.pdf 
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circumstances, they are agent based in both an individual and collective level, and they 
are reactive to the environment, which relates to the fact that they are open systems.  
Finally, complex social systems are rule following, which reflects onto all of its 
functions and the way they are carried on, for agents, to have successful interaction 
need a certain measure of stability, which can only be achieved with the creation of 
rules and their enforcement. 
Major Robert K. Calhoun and Captain Brendan F. Hayward of the Australian Army take 
the notion of a social complex adaptive system to a concrete level and summarize it:26 
Complex adaptive systems consist of agents which comprise all the component actors of 
the system or society. These agents may be individuals, groups or systems. They 
include governments, political parties, local leaderships, potential or actual insurgents 
and their supporters, security forces, businesses, religious groups, gangs, criminal 
elements, schools, universities, the media and non-government organisations. The 
agents interact with one another and their environment continuously in both deliberate 
and spontaneous ways. Some of the consequences of these interactions are linear and 
predictable; others are not… 
 
b) Definition of society 
Having made a development of society from a trans disciplinary perspective, it is 
necessary to advance a definition of it, which will be the foundation of the rest of the 
theoretical effort made on this book.  
Society can be thus defined as a group humans(as coherent high cognition systems) 
interconnected and interacting by means of a language that bridges their domains of 
cognition; they can act collectively and create rules and institutions to sustain and 
monitor their interactions, the latter which can vary in hierarchical dimension, content 
and purpose, having as a consequence a series of realities of their making which 
converge into a system that possesses changing degrees of complexity in response to 
external factors, such as the environment and the passage of time and internal factors 
such as the attitudes, feelings and collective identity of their human element. 
 
                                                
26Calhoun, R., Hayward,B.F. Stabilising Complex Adaptive Systems Using Complexity Theory In 
Operational Design  For Stabilisation And Support Operations, Australian Army Journal ,VII, 3. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/CalhounHayward_Stabilising_Complex_Adaptive_Systems.pdf 
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Conclusion 
FIRST.- Language is the key instrument for the creation of social systems and the 
generation of knowledge, but at the same time is part of the latter. Language is the 
cohesive agent in human interaction, though it Society comes to be. 
SECOND.- Knowledge departs from the dichotomy of a knower and the things he 
knows, which are separate from him. 
THIRD.- Language implies a dichotomy between the speaker and the things he speaks. 
Language is a creative cognitive machine. 
FOURTH.- Society is more than the sum of individuals: Knowledge and the institutions 
created by means of speech acts are part of it as well. Society is more than a sum of 
people, it is also their knowledge and the institutional facts created by them. It is a 
combination of action and function. 
FIFTH.- Communication is a circular process, so is the generation of knowledge and so 
are social interactions.  
SIXTH.- There is a biological basis for Society, but the latter is not a living system. 
SEVENTH.- Because they are at the same time observing and observed systems, social 
systems have features of first and second cybernetic systems. 
EIGHT.- Institutional facts need to be recognized to be maintained, otherwise, the social 
structure they hold collapses, this is done by means of communication, which is 
circular, and language. 
NINTH.- Social systems are self creative, because languages have generativity, that is, 
they have the capacity to have an infinite number of sentences. Social systems can take 
many shapes and configurations, language transcends through all of them. 
TENTH.- Society is a complex system because it comprises the totality of interactions 
and social units. 
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